SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).

LINK FOR THIS CABLE:

Le Monde, “Erdogan is viewed as an authoritarian, lacking a vision”

Der Spiegel mentions “America’s dark view of Turkish Premier Erdogan”

SUMMARY
__

¶1. (C) PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to
have a firm grip on power — if for no other reasons that
there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
core U.S. interests. End summary.

¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player’s swagger and
phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader
to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won
Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through
parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of
the people, without a viable or discernible political
rival…outside his own ruling AKP.

¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And
is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
and momentum they need from the Turkish side?

¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main
opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,
broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan’s
rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
Turkey; other party leaders’ political bankruptcy; and the
stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues
that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro
indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority
of AKP’s nationwide party machine is blurring with the
Turkish State’s executive power at the provincial and
district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors
seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.

¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful
challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
of religion; identity and history; rule of law).

EU
–

¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a
negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The
Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.

¶7. (C) But there’s always a Monday morning and the debate on
the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a
date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan’s political survival
and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have
resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions
of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
insinuations into the press in parallel with the
nationalists’ assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,
neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal
steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
tackling the fundamental — some Turks would say insidious –
legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The
road ahead will surely be hard.

¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP
chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is
that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
at Turkey’s ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread
skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
ten years.

¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin
Gul’s MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
bruised Turkey feels at the EU’s inconsistency during the
final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
have given us the other side of the story). Gul was
noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
Brussels according to “Aksam” Ankara bureau chief Nuray
Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan’s advisors got phone
calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran
says that at least some of Erdogan’s advisors urged him to do
so.

¶10. (C) AKP’s lack of cohesion as a party and lack of
openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
membership…or at least the process. Some see the process
as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
remains of the arid “secularism” of Kemalism. We have also
run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey’s
role is to spread Islam in Europe, “to take back Andalusia
and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683″ as one
participant in a recent meeting at AKP’s main think tank put
it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.

¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert
that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
express concern that harmonization and membership will water
down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as
AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, “If the EU
says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then
the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,
it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
run.”

¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to
prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator
Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
the Turkish chief negotiator’s responsibility to sell the EU
position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because
the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
internal rival Gul.

¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing
with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of
“one of us”, i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP’s civil
service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the
government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP’s previous
hires at all levels.

Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
———————————————

¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan’s
and AKP’s ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
the U.S.

¶15. (C) First is Erdogan’s character.

¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected
that Erdogan’s hunger for absolute power and for the material
benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst
Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)
Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging
by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
collectors in all 81 provinces.

¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan’s hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, “Tayyip Bey believes in God…but doesn’t trust
him.” In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context — or real
facts — of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as “exceptionally dangerous.”
Erdogan’s other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.

¶18. (C) Erdogan’s pragmatism serves him well but he lacks
vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that
lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those
around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
policies.

¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly
traveling abroad — reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
two years — with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
Russia, “Eurasia”, the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his
staff says 2005 is the “year of Africa”, but they provide no
coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has
exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we
understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key
financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
elections, is disaffected by Erdogan’s unapproachability.
Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.

¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited
number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
some — principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek –
to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to
Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul’s readiness
to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
Erdogan’s maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
credentials by making statements inimical to good
U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a
partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
unable to remove the influence of Gul.

¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising
to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers
AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
among close family members of ministers. We have heard from
two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.

¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently
involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,
Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in
the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu’s extortion racket
and other activities has already produced evidence
incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we
have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
trend is a time bomb.

¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan’s and AKP’s
appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range
of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of
the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state
bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many
interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan’s deputy
party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders
such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom
appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for
their bosses as their party general secretary and as
Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left
himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of
day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive
channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the
Turkish state.

Two Big Questions
—————–

¶24. (C) Turkey’s EU bid has brought forth reams of
pronouncements and articles — Mustafa Akyol’s
Gulenist-tinged “Thanksgiving for Turkey” in Dec. 27 Weekly
Standard is one of the latest — attempting to portray Islam
in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a
strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see
in Turkey’s theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with
the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent
(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in
theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively
progressive.

¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is
that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of
“secular” pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)
pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to
follow their narrow, occult “true way”, and (3) the faction-
and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs
Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in
Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and
intolerant of other religions’ presence in Turkey, and unable
to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,
anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly
educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
long been used to justify violence against “infidels”.

¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of
politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.

¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its
citizens to history — the history of this land and citizens’
individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief
assembles his party cadres and, warning against various
ideological threats, proclaims, “The future is certain. It’s
only that damned past that keeps changing.”

¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,
including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will
it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are
joining what is still only a handful of others to take
tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)
Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a “long and delicate
road.”

¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN

201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348

Sipdis

E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

LINK FOR THIS CABLE:

Le Monde, “Erdogan is viewed as an authoritarian, lacking a vision”

Der Spiegel mentions “America’s dark view of Turkish Premier Erdogan”

SUMMARY
_

¶1. (C) P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey’s democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.

¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.

¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.

¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT’s new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.

Who are we dealing with?

¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.

¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to AK’s image as the party of change at the national level, good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey’s urban sprawls and across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.

¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government’s inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment’s opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey’s lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AK government’s actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.

¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey’s EU candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan’s view of relations with the u.s.

¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey’s economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks’s ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki seminary.

¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament’s March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.

The deeper challenges for erdogan

¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:

–Erdogan’s character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan’s character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.

–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).

–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party’s choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK’s ability to govern both at the local and national level.

–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.

–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen’s revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan’s direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.

–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan’s refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.

Comment

¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON’S VISIT TO
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10

Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to
Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the
Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU
leaders at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion.
Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and
Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely
raise concern about General Motors’ November 3 decision to
keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely
raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from
Germany. You may wish to encourage from them:

– Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will
not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to
the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted;
– Support for including banking and insurance relations with
Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no
backsliding on export controls;
– Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S.
at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate;
– Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel;
– German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on
security issues and human rights.

Recognizing Germany’s prominent and international role on
this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to
get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration
and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is
learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he
can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may
look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an
alternative role on foreign policy. End summary.

Political Climate
—————–

¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent
election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in
of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be
swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned
from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington,
which front-paged her address to Congress in every
publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her
priorities for the next legislative term — she gives a major
state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues
– and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic
recovery and growth (Opel, regulation), progress in
addressing climate change (Copenhagen), and strengthening
Germany’s international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle
will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign
ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure
what he wants yet.

Economic Climate
—————-

¶3. (C) Germany’s export-driven economy is showing initial
signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II.
For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should
show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has
remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized
programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the
government’s record budget deficit, there is heated debate
over the wisdom of the new coalition’s proposed tax cuts,
intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the
outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on
the G-20′s regulatory agenda than addressing global
imbalances.

¶4. (C) GM’s sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale
of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the
German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel’s
chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that
Merkel was so furious at GM’s about-face that she refused to
take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently
called the President. Federal and state governments are
demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in
bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What
particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to
forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of
laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in
loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel
jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM
decision just hours after delivering her address before
Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November
4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days,
and politicians and others are citing the GM action as
another example of American “turbo-capitalism.”

Berlin 00001403 002 of 003

Iran/Export Controls
———————–

¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel’s strong
statement during her speech to Congress that there should be
“zero tolerance” for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. You should stress the importance of German
support for EU measures or measures taken by “like-minded”
countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible
Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle,
it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1
unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular
importance of continued German leadership on export control,
particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms
shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports
by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and
dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its
intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the
danger is that German standards could be watered down to an
EU lowest common denominator.

Arms Control/Disarmament
————————

¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly
calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although
he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets
him attention and he then offers assurances that everything
must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other
issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that
distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel’s CDU, and
Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA
emphasizes that Westerwelle’s position does not necessarily
mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO
nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet
of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also
understands that some Allies may want to maintain their
current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with
Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines
or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the
road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are
uncomfortable with Westerwelle’s push and sees no reason to
tackle this issue right now.

Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops
—————————————–

¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German
engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as
vital to German national security interests. However, he
supports the Chancellor’s recent decision to put off any
consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until
after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan
early next year, notwithstanding the significantly
deteriorated security situation in the north. The new
government sees the
conference as critical for setting a new framework and
benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on
the Germans’ sense of “ownership” of the north in getting a
commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.
Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge
that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
civilian police training program, which it joined in January
of this year.

Middle East
———–

¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements
before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance
of Israel’s security and a two-state solution. In general,
Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle
East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli
government consultations, likely before the end of the year.
She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages
to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be
planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may
seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to
offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with
the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the
concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure

BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003

for the Middle East.

Reluctance with Overseas Deployments
————————————

¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of
overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general,
tend to be more skeptical than Merkel’s CDU on this topic and
this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The
coalition agreement calls for a “gradual reduction” of German
participation in UNIFIL “with the perspective of bringing it
to an end.” Similarly, the agreement calls for a “critical
review” of the “multitude” of parliamentary mandates for the
Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward
reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how
important we view Germany’s contributions to these
international operations.

Russia/Energy Security
———————-

¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian
bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier — known for his
relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
with this difficult “strategic partner.” Germany is Europe’s
largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for
energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a
vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on
Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that
it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
energy generation to gain greater energy security.

Climate Change
————–

¶11. (C) As the Chancellor’s remarks underline, German
officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU
position towards the major emerging economies, particularly
China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national
actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our
commitment to domestic and international actions that will
allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change
legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations
for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement
next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
Summit as one step in a larger process — a politically
binding framework — and may be preparing the German public
for a less ambitious outcome.

Mission Germany
—————

¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in
Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH)
employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs
and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This
includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose
responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin’s
USG presence — over 500 USDHs and LE staff — is centered in
the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff
includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over
30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT
solutions xxxxx.
MURPHY

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019
TAGS: GM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE’S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW IN
GERMANY; MERKEL GAINS SECOND TERM

REF: A. BERLIN 1188
¶B. BERLIN 1186
¶C. BERLIN 1176
¶D. BERLIN 1167
¶E. BERLIN 1162
¶F. BERLIN 1138
¶G. BERLIN 1179

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

LINKS FOR THIS CABLE

Der Spiegel highlights the “details of the German decision-making process”

The Nation insists on “What WikiLeaks does – and doesn’t – tell us about Germany”

SUMMARY
——-

¶1. (C) Chancellor Merkel achieved her goal of a solid
parliamentary majority for her Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), and the pro-business Free Democratic Party
(FDP), but will have to contend with a self-confident FDP
that is likely to seek major concessions in terms of policy
and personnel. Nonetheless, the CDU/CSU’s 33.8 percent
showing was its lowest since 1949, while the FDP’s 14.6
percent was its strongest in the history of the Federal
Republic. The SPD crashed, while the Left Party and Greens
were able to score their highest results ever, with the Left
Party surpassing the Greens overall and overtaking the SPD in
the eastern German states by a wide margin. Merkel hopes
that coalition negotiations with the FDP will be “quick and
decisive,” while FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle — widely
expected to be the next foreign minister — has emphasized
his intention to press for the party’s goals of a fundamental
tax reform, more emphasis on education, and stronger
protection of civil liberties. Merkel and Westerwelle
already met privately election night (September 27) and
coalition negotiations should begin soon, most likely with
the goal of having a formal agreement with the selection of a
cabinet by the time the Bundestag convenes a month from now.
End Summary.

OVERALL TREND: MAJOR PARTIES IN DECLINE
—————————————

¶2. (U) The results show the decline of the major parties –
particularly the SPD — and the strengthening of a five-party
system. Preliminary results give CDU/CSU 33.8 percent
(versus 35.2 percent in 2005); the FDP 14.6 percent (9.8);
the SPD 23.0 (34.3); the Left Party 11.9 (8.7), and the
Greens 10.7 (8.1). The decline in the CDU/CSU percentage is
due particularly to the CSU’s losses in Bavaria, where the
party suffered its worst Bundestag result ever at 42.6
percent, down from 49.2 percent in 2005, but it still won all
45 of its constituencies. These preliminary results give the
CDU 24 “surplus mandates” because of the high number of
constituency seats it won despite its low 33.8 percent second
vote showing (see REFTEL G).

¶3. (U) The new coalition should end up with control of both
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Upper Council). Based on
the preliminary official results, the CDU/CSU will have 239
seats in the Bundestag (up from 226), which along with the 93
FDP Bundestag seats (previously 61) would give the new
government a solid majority. The SPD will have 146 seats in
the Bundestag (down from 222), the Left Party 76 (versus 54)
and the Greens 68 (versus 51). The Schleswig Holstein
election on September 27 also appears to have given the CDU
and FDP a parliamentary majority in that state. With CDU-FDP
governments there and in Saxony, where the two parties won a
majority on August 30, the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will
soon have a majority in the Bundesrat and should be able to
gain its approval of future coalition legislation.

¶4. (C) Chancellor Merkel and her CDU/CSU Union are somewhat
disappointed by their party’s results, but are publicly
emphasizing that the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition has met its
demise and will be replaced by a center-right coalition
composed of the CDU/CSU and FDP. “We achieved something
fantastic,” said Chancellor Merkel, now facing a second
four-year term. “We achieved a stable majority in Germany
for a new government…We can party tonight, but there is a
lot of work waiting for us.” An uncharacteristically
emotional Merkel — clearly relieved by her victory –
promised to be the “Chancellor of all Germans” — old and
young, entrepreneurs and workers — and said the CDU/CSU
would be sufficiently dominant in the new coalition to
prevail “in questions that affect social balance.”

¶5. (C) Despite her huge personal popularity, however, Merkel
led her CDU/CSU Union to its second poorest result in
history, leaving her vulnerable to future backstabbing within

BERLIN 00001197 002 OF 003

her party. Merkel — while happy to be rid of the Grand
Coalition with the SPD — now faces the challenging task of
entering a coalition with a party that could prove to be more
difficult to manage than the SPD. Merkel will start talks
with the FDP within days. It could, however, take up to the
end of October for the parties to forge the policy
compromises and work out the distribution of cabinet posts
necessary to seal a coalition deal.

FDP: THE REAL WINNER
——————–

¶6. (C) The FDP will return to government after eleven years
in opposition, having achieved its best election results in
the party’s history. Its leader, FDP Party Chairman Guido
Westerwelle, will most likely become Germany’s next foreign
minister (see REFTEL E). At the FDP election celebration,
Westerwelle told his party faithful that “We want to be part
of the government. But this means responsibility, and we are
ready to take on this responsibility.” Westerwelle said his
party would work to ensure that Germany gets a “fair tax
system and better educational opportunities” and that civil
rights would once again be respected. The FDP will be in a
very powerful position to demand a larger number of cabinet
seats in a new German government. They are likely to expect
to get at least the equivalent of what they have had in the
past: the foreign office, either justice or perhaps interior
(which they led from 1969-82), economics or possibly finance,
and at least one other ministry (in the past they have had
education and economic cooperation (i.e. development).
However, the FDP will find it difficult to negotiate a
coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU over the coming weeks,
especially in the areas of tax cuts (see REFTEL F) and civil
rights, including data privacy (see REFTEL D).

SPD: HARD ROAD AHEAD
——————–

¶7. (C) It would be hard to exaggerate the dimension of the
SPD defeat. The party fell more than 11 points to its worst
result in the post-war period. Its share of the eastern
German vote was 19 percent, behind both the CDU and Left
Party, and the FDP came within striking distance of the SPD
in some western German states, including Bavaria, where the
SPD’s 17 percent was just ahead of the FDP’s 15 percent. The
SPD election-night party was like a funeral, and Steinmeier
and SPD party chairman Muentefering appeared grim-faced to
announce that Steinmeier would be the Bundestag caucus
chairman and thus unofficial leader of the opposition to the
new black-yellow government. Muentefering did not, as many
expected, announce his resignation but it is likely to come
by the time of the next party conference in mid-November.

¶8. (C) Exit polls show that the SPD lost more than a million
votes to former supporters who simply stayed home and
additional voters to the Left Party and Greens, and that the
public still blames it for the changes in unemployment
insurance and the retirement age enacted during the Schroeder
government and as part of the grand coalition. The SPD, with
only four minister-presidents and a shrunken parliamentary
caucus, will have to decide how to profile itself against its
two fellow leftist opposition parties, and the party left is
likely to press for coalitions with the Left and Greens at
the state level.

LEFT OVERTAKES GREENS
———————

¶9. (C) The Left Party — under Oskar Lafontaine’s and Gregor
Gysi’s leadership — can also claim electoral victory with
their party’s best showing ever in a parliamentary election.
Having won 11.9 per cent of the total vote and 20 direct
mandates — the largest number ever for one of the smaller
parties — it will be difficult for Germany’s other parties,
especially the SPD, to ignore The Left’s steady rise in
popularity in east and west Germany (see REFTEL B). The
party successfully stole the SPD’s thunder and was partially
responsible for the SPD’s poorest showing ever in German
election history. The Left Party can now concentrate on
achieving the ultimate prize in German politics in 2013: a
governing coalition with the SPD and the Greens. Berlin SPD
Governing Mayor Klaus Wowereit has already said that this
year’s election must be the last one in which the SPD
excludes the possibility of cooperation with the Left, and he
and other left-wingers in the SPD will likely fight to bring
the two parties closer together.

GREENS: HOW TO STAY RELEVANT?

BERLIN 00001197 003 OF 003

—————————–

¶10. (C) The Greens may have celebrated their first double
digit showing (10.7 per cent) in a parliamentary election,
but the party was unsuccessful in preventing a black-yellow
coalition or becoming the third strongest party in the
Bundestag (see REFTEL A). Party Co-Chairman Cem Oezdemir –
who failed to win his direct mandate and was too low on the
party list to win a seat in the Bundestag — said that the
Greens would establish themselves as a “think tank for social
issues and for Germany as a whole.” The SPD’s disastrous
electoral result will remind the Greens that they may need to
reach out to the CDU if they are to remain a relevant
political power. For the foreseeable future, Oezdemir hinted
that his party would concentrate on achieving good results at
future state elections and plotting their return to power in
¶2013.

COMMENT
——-

¶11. (C) Chancellor Merkel’s main campaign objective — to
attract centrist support by out-positioning the SPD as the
best protector of Germany’s social welfare state — was
successful, although her CDU/CSU union suffered losses,
primarily because of the CSU. She will now have to find a
way to balance this promise with FDP demands for greater
reforms while dealing with the likely struggles between a
strengthened FDP and a CSU that is concerned about its
continued decline. The parties will now enter complex
coalition negotiations with pressure to complete them by the
time that the new Bundestag convenes in late October, these
talks have the potential to be very contentious. Merkel will
want to stamp her authority on the coalition agreement, while
Westerwelle will be a tough bargaining partner for Merkel as
he aims to extract the maximum amount of policy and personnel
concessions from the CDU/CSU. Finally, as a weakened SPD
moves into the opposition, it can be expected that it will
seek to continue the public debate on the major campaign
issues and begin to rebuild itself, a process that could
include its strong re-positioning to the left.

¶12. (C) What does a CDU/CSU-FDP victory mean for the United
States? On a practical level, Germany will have a new
foreign minister, most likely Guido Westerwelle, who has
enjoyed a difficult relationship with the United States
during his time spent in opposition (see REFTEL D).
Westerwelle will face a steep learning curve at the MFA, but
we should not expect him to play second fiddle to Chancellor
Merkel. The foreign and security policy rivalry between the
MFA and Chancellery during the Bush Administration will not
disappear. Indeed, they may be enhanced with Westerwelle’s
attempt to profile and make an international name for himself
as quickly as possible, making it difficult for us to
identify who is in the lead on any given issue. Chancellor
Merkel and Westerwelle will be competing for attention; the
latter’s flamboyant and outgoing style may give him a leg up
but Chancellor Merkel will be keen to assert her primacy in
international affairs, especially on economic and EU matters.
She has more government and foreign policy experience that
will come in handy in this future duel, and in an age of
international summitry, the Chancellor rather than the
Foreign Minister calls the shots. We should not
underestimate her desire to carve out a political legacy for
herself, especially in the international arena, and her
record of strong cooperation with Washington suggests that
her dominance is likely to have a net benefit for US
interests.

¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates General
Duesseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.
Murphy

DE RUEHRL #1296/01 2891501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161501Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5511
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001296

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: GERMANY COULD HAVE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN
TWO WEEKS

REF: BERLIN 1271

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor George Glass for reasons 1.
4 (b,d).

LINKS FOR THIS CABLE

Der Spiegel highlights the “details of the German decision-making process”

The Nation insists on “What WikiLeaks does – and doesn’t – tell us about Germany”

SUMMARY
__

¶1. (C//NF) A well-placed Free Democratic Party
(FDP) source told Emboffs October 15 that Chancellor Angela
Merkel aims to finish coalition negotiations between her
Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and
the FDP by October 18, but that the FDP viewed a completion
of October 23 to be more feasible. Either date would allow
the parties to hold conventions to approve the agreement
during the following days and enable the Bundestag to elect
Angela Merkel Chancellor on October 28, one day after the
first scheduled meeting of the new Bundestag. FDP source
said that in any case, the virtually certain future Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle would want to do the Chancellor
“the favor” of ensuring her election before her upcoming
visit to Washington on November 2. A worst case scenario –
and least likely — is that she would be elected by November
8, source said, just prior to the November 9 fall of the Wall
anniversary. Source provided Emboffs with a list of the 15
mostly domestic-oriented points included in the FDP campaign
platform that it wants to see included in the coalition
agreement, including withdrawal of the remaining
non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil, the only one
addressing foreign policy (reftel). End summary.

¶2. (C//NF) Source provided Emboffs with a schedule of the
next days of the coalition negotiations. The schedule showed
that the various working groups of the negotiations would
each report to the plenary (see reftel) October 16-17, with a
smaller group of the plenary then meeting on October 17 to
iron out disputed issues and beginning discussions on
division of the ministerial portfolios between the parties.
Chancellor Merkel, source said, hopes to wrap up the
coalition negotiations on October 18 after a full-day plenary
session, a goal he described as “very ambitious but
possible.” Source noted that the FDP was not as optimistic
that a conclusion could be reached as of October 18, and
scheduled three more plenary sessions for October 21, 22 and
¶23. He noted that it is feasible that a coalition agreement
could be concluded by that date and that the three parties
would then hold conventions to approve the agreement in the
days following.

¶3. (C//NF) This schedule would enable the Bundestag to then
elect Merkel as Chancellor October 28, the day after its
first plenary. Source noted, however, that the FDP has
alerted the party of three possible party convention dates:
October 25 — if things go as plans, November 1 — if
negotiations are prolonged, or November 8 — worst case
scenario. Source said that it would not be “unattractive”
for Westerwelle to attend the EU Summit October 29-30. This
would be a good “debut” for Westerwelle, he added. In the
event negotiations are prolonged, source said that
Westerwelle would like to do the Chancellor “the favor” by
enabling her to be elected Chancellor before she travels to
Washington November 2.

¶4. (C//NF) About the actual negotiations, FDP source
provided Emboffs with 15 points from their election platform
that the FDP would like to see included in the coalition
agreement. The majority of the 15 points focus on domestic
economic and social issues, including structural tax reform,
amendments to the social welfare and pension systems, and
support for education. The points also include the goal of
ending what is termed “unnecessary and ineffective” measures
to censor the internet and preventing domestic military
deployments. The final point, and the only one that concerns
foreign policy, calls for “entering negotiations with our
allies” in order to achieve a withdrawal of nuclear weapons
stationed in Germany during the next legislative term.
(Note: In response to Emboff questions, source said that the
goal really is to develop a plan for the withdrawal of the
nuclear weapons. End note.) FDP source said that
conscription is a disputed issue that is still under
discussion. Regarding Turkey’s EU membership, FDP source
said that the FDP would rather not include anything on this
subject in the agreement, arguing that it will not be at
issue during the next four years.

¶5. (C//NF) FDP source assessed that about 85 percent of the
issues will be decided during this coming weekend. The FDP
intends to keep the remaining 15 percent of the issues open
and use them as bargaining tools for decisions on the
division of ministerial portfolios. Regarding portfolios,
FDP source commented off the record that current Interior
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble had been trying to serve as the

CDU’s “grey eminence,” seeking to exert influence over many
of the working groups, beyond his own working group of
internal security. Source said that the FDP viewed his role
negatively, and that he was referred to within the FDP as “an
angry old man.” He indicated that he hoped the CDU would
also view his role as counterproductive. Source, however,
noted that the agreement will only state which ministerial
portfolios each party will receive, without providing any
names. He stressed that it is up to each party to then
decide who will fill those positions.

Murphy

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA “TEFLON” MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS

Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY
——-

¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the “hot
phase” of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel — to great applause
– focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an “identity crisis,” and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU’s election mantra: “we
have the strength” throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany’s role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.

¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary
elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP
to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one
hundred percent certainty — given the SPD’s chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options — that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.

MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP
————————————

¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel — to rapturous cries of “Angie,
Angie” and a standing ovation — took to the floor at her
party’s September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU “have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections” but also cautioning that “the
election’s outcome has not yet been decided.” On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government’s record,
noting its success in countering Germany’s economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections–
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the “middle” of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: “Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone.”
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an “identity crisis,” adding that, “The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught.” She asked,
“How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?” Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called “black-yellow” (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD’s plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)

¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony’s CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful “Laender” (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit’s Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse’s Minister President Roland Koch
– to great applause — noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is “anti-American and
anti-European.” (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option

BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003

exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the
Left Party. END NOTE.)

CSU Truce with FDP?
——————-

¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw
his party’s support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP’s real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle — in an attempt to enter government at all
costs — might support a “traffic light” coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.

AFGHANISTAN – A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?
—————————————-

¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media’s frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU’s Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany’s ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s support for Germany’s
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU’s xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for
the Chancellor not to address Germany’s role in Afghanistan
in the coming weeks. Given the German public’s overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.

COMMENT
——-

¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel
will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer’s attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor’s promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.

¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU’s relative
weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD’s perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor’s high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.

¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention
to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her — despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public — to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is

BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003

looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25
percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier’s unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left
Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR, L, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: DATA PRIVACY TRUMPS SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF A
FDP VICTORY ON COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

REF: A. BERLIN 988
¶B. 2008 BERLIN 504
¶C. 2008 BERLIN 354

Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don Brown for Reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Current polling data suggest that the
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party
(FDP) could receive sufficient votes in the September 27
national elections to form a governing coalition. The FDP
are strong defenders of citizens’ privacy rights and these
views have led the FDP to oppose all of Germany’s recent
counterterrorism legislative proposals, as well as voice
concerns about U.S.-German and U.S.-EU information sharing
initiatives. Throughout these debates, the FDP has favored
data protection measures over the need for governments to
strengthen security-related information sharing for
counterterrorism purposes. The FDP’s strong views on
individual liberties and personal privacy could lead to
complications concerning law enforcement security cooperation
and data sharing. Were the FDP to join the government, we
expect they would closely scrutinize any proposals for
security officials to access and/or share information
concerning private persons with international partners,
including the USG. End Summary.

THE FDP AND DATA PRIVACY
————————

¶2. (C) The FDP defines itself as a independent pro-business
party, advocating low taxes, open trade, and minimal
government intervention in business and private life. The
party promotes European liberalism, championing freedom and
individual responsibility under a government “as extensive as
necessary, and as limited as possible.” The FDP’s limited
government viewpoint shapes their views on counterterrorism
policy. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and in
reaction to a number of terrorist plots uncovered in Germany,
successive German governments have passed a series of
legislative packages that have strengthened Germany’s
counterterrorism legal frameworks and broadened the
investigative powers of law enforcement agencies. The FDP,
which was not a member of these post-9/11 governing
coalitions, regularly criticized these amendments for
infringing on citizens’ personal privacy rights. The FDP’s
criticisms of security-related data sharing agreements have
also extended to the U.S.-Germany bilateral “Pruem-like”
agreement to share personal information on serious crime and
terrorism suspects (ref C), the U.S.-EU Passenger Name
Recognition (PNR) initiative, and elements of the Visa Waiver
Program that involve sharing information on travelers.

FDP Objections to Counterterrorism Laws
—————————————

¶3. (C) FDP parliamentarians and party leaders were strong
critics of the CDU/CSU – SPD government’s introduction of two
new counterterrorism legislative proposals, the BKA Law and
the Terror Camp Law. Passed in 2008 and enacted at the
beginning of 2009, the BKA Law increased the investigative
powers of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA).
The most controversial aspect of the BKA Law was that it
permitted security officials to use a variety of technical
surveillance measures in terrorism investigations (Ref B).
Specifically, the law provides the BKA with the power to
conduct remote, on-line investigations of the computers of
terrorism and serious crime suspects. The FDP strongly
opposed these measures as an unnecessary invasion of privacy,
despite the limitation of on-line searches to only
life-threatening situations (or threats to the constitutional
order of the German state). These cases would require a
judge’s advance approval and are expected to number just a
dozen cases per year. Nevertheless, FDP parliamentarian Max
Stadler called the measures “constitutionally questionable,”
and in a meeting with EMIN, Stadler feared that authorities
would carry out surveillance without sufficient evidence of
wrongdoing. FDP parliamentarian Gisela Piltz warned that the
law would turn the BKA into a “super spy agency resembling
the FBI.” Former FDP Federal Interior Minister, Gerhart
Baum, blasted the law, saying it violated privacy rights,
freedom of the press, and the inviolability of private
residences.

¶4. (C) Earlier this summer, the government passed legislation
developed by the Justice Ministry that criminalized a range
of terrorism-related preparatory actions such as distributing
information on bomb-making and participating in para-military
training overseas (ref A). The law was developed in response
to the September 2007 arrests in Germany of three homegrown
terrorists who had attended an Islamic Jihad Union terrorism
training camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Justice Ministry officials and prosecutors have told EconOffs
that the new law has closed gaps in Germany’s legal framework
that had previously prevented German prosecutors from
charging German citizens and residents with activities that
directly or indirectly supported terrorist groups. Prior to
the passage of the law, the FDP criticized the draft as
unnecessary, claiming that existing legislation was
sufficient to arrest and prosecute potential terrorists in
Germany. The FDP also criticized that law for allegedly
requiring prosecutors to be able to prove that individuals
who participate in training at overseas terrorist camps
actually intend to carry out attacks; that the law would
thereby permit the punishment for thoughts, rather than for
actions. Justice Ministry officials have indicated to
EconOffs that these criticisms are unfounded hyperbole and
that prosecutors will be able to build strong cases against
those who undergo training at foreign terrorist training
sites.

FDP Objects to U.S.-German Data Sharing Agreement
——————————————— —-

¶5. (C) Immediately following the March 2008 completion of the
U.S.-German data sharing agreement to enhance cooperation in
preventing and combating terrorism and other serious crime
(aka, the Pruem-like agreement, Ref C), FDP parliamentarians
began to express concerns regarding the agreement. FDP
members took particular aim at an article in the agreement
that calls for additional data protection measures to be
taken if special categories of personal data (such as ethnic
origin, political opinion, religion, trade union membership,
and sexual orientation) are transferred among law enforcement
agencies. (Comment: In our discussions with FDP
parliamentarians, we explained that negotiators did not
foresee that such information would need to be transferred
regularly and that the article was inserted as a means of
providing extra data privacy protections in the rare
occurrence that such information was pertinent to an
investigation. End Comment.) In meetings with EMIN, Stadler
and Piltz also expressed objections to the data retention
periods of the agreement, questioned which USG law
enforcement agencies would have access to the information,
and voiced a general concern about potential misuse of the
personal information (names, DOBs, addresses, passport
numbers, etc.) that would be shared by the agreement. Piltz
further claimed that the U.S. government as a whole lacked
effective data protection measures in comparison to Germany
and questioned why the USG does not have a overall federal
data protection commissioner as Germany does. (Comment:
Piltz’ remark underscores the importance of ensuring German
officials receive information about USG data protection
policy. The April visit to Berlin by DHS Chief Privacy
Officer Callahan was useful in this regard, but more needs to
be done to ensure German officials understand U.S. data
protection policy. End Comment.)

¶6. (C) FDP leaders have also taken aim at U.S.-EU agreements
that include data sharing elements. Following the July EU
GAERC decision to give the Swedish EU Presidency a mandate to
begin negotiating a successor agreement governing USG access
to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) database of financial
transactions, FDP head Guido Westerwelle called the plan
“totally unacceptable” and said that the “plan must be
stopped.” Parliamentarian Piltz, who is a member of the
Bundestag Interior Committee, has criticized the U.S.-EU
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer agreement for
collecting “pointless” information on travelers and she
doubts whether the information collected under PNR would be
of any value to law enforcement officials. In meetings with
EconOffs, Piltz broadly spoke of governments, particularly
that of the U.S., accumulating large amounts of data on their
(mostly) innocent citizens. Piltz expressed concerns that
German commercial interests could be damaged when U.S.
authorities obtained PNR data on German business travelers
that might somehow be shared with American competitors.

Would the FDP be a reliable security partner?
———————————————

¶7. (C) The FDP’s voting record on counterterrorism
legislation and the views of leading FDP security policy
figures described here suggest that cooperation on security
matters, particularly those involving information sharing,
with a future German government that includes the FDP could
be problematic. At times, the FDP’s fixation on data privacy
and protection issues looks to have come at the expense of
the party forming responsible views on security policy. The
FDP has been out of power for over 10 years and lack
experience tackling security issues in the Internet age. The
FDP appears not to fully grasp the transnational character of
terrorism today and terrorists’ increasing use of the
Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize. Current Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)
has repeatedly drawn attention to terrorist use of the
Internet, which he calls the “main medium of holy war against
the West – it is the communication platform, advertising
medium, distance university, training camp, think tank and
recruiting instrument for terrorists.” Schaeuble understands
that combating terrorism in a globalized world requires
international cooperation and for security officials to use
modern technology. No FDP leader has displayed a similar
understanding of the need to find a proper balance between
personal freedoms and security measures; the FDP has all too
often found it politically expedient to cast these goals as
mutually exclusive.

¶8. (C) At election campaign rallies last week FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle criticized the on-line surveillance
measures contained in the BKA law and championed the FDP as
the sole party committed to data privacy and protection
issues. FDP parliamentarian Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger has been suggested as a possible
Justice Minister in a CDU/CSU – FDP government, a job she
previously held under Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU). Given
that she resigned as Justice Minister in 1996 after failing
to obtain support for her rejection of a CDU proposal to
expand the state’s right to monitor private citizens, we
would expect her to closely scrutinize all bilateral and
U.S.-EU information sharing proposals. In particular, a
FDP-led Justice Ministry could well complicate implementation
of the bilateral Pruem-like agreement, prevent negotiations
on a HSPD-6 terrorist screening data sharing arrangement, and
raise objections to U.S.-EU information sharing initiatives.

¶9. (C) An MFA official working in the counterterrorism office
noted that one reason the FDP has been so vocal in opposing
Germany’s counterterrorism legislative drafts, bilateral and
U.S.-EU security initiatives is due to the fact that they are
in the opposition. Pure political considerations dictate
that the role of the opposition is to oppose the governing
coalition’s proposals. Following this line of reasoning,
were the FDP to join the CDU/CSU in a governing coalition,
the responsibilities of power would perhaps convince them to
take a more constructive approach to counterterrorism and
security issues. Furthermore, given that the FDP would be
the junior partner in the coalition, we hope that CDU/CSU
leadership would ensure that German legal frameworks are
adequate and that law enforcement and security officials
continue our current close cooperation and robust information
sharing on operational matters.

Murphy

NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D’AFFAIRES JOHN M. KOENIG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2034
TAGS: GM MARR NATO PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT’S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT

BERLIN 00000345 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

¶1. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel will be focused on a productive,
substantive meeting when you visit Baden-Baden April 3.
Germany holds the greatest untapped potential in Europe for
our transatlantic agenda; unlocking it will take sustained
effort by the Administration, and the payoff will not be
immediate. What is most on Merkel,s mind is her political
future, six months before national elections, with her poll
numbers wobbling and her coalition increasingly
dysfunctional. Germany,s capacity to act is constrained by
(1) the short-term demands of domestic politics (about which
we can do little), (2) the slow pace of change in public
support for a German leadership role (a focus of our
engagement), and (3) the constant demands of the economic
crisis. Your meeting provides an opportunity to map out key
priorities with Germany for the remainder of Merkel,s
current term and beyond.

———————————
Merkel,s Own Crisis — Leadership
———————————

¶2. (S/NF) Merkel is methodical, rational, and pragmatic –
qualities that propelled her to stratospheric levels of
public support early in her tenure, when she presided over a
recovering economy and a successful presidency of the
European Union. The past year has been less kind, and the
almost exactly equal split in the German electorate between
left and right is re-emerging as elections approach. Merkel
now faces a &Gordian knot8 of rising unemployment, economic
crisis, and domestic political dissatisfaction at a time when
she can least afford a wrong move. The effectiveness of
Merkel,s &Grand Coalition8 government is declining as her
Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Social Democratic (SPD)
partners begin in earnest their campaigns for the September
2009 election. The Chancellor,s edge over the rival SPD,
led by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is
diminishing. When cornered, Merkel can be tenacious but is
risk averse and rarely creative. This suggests she will
remain a very circumspect Ally until the election.

¶3. (C/NF) The collapse of German exports and industrial
activity has shocked Chancellor Merkel and her advisors.
They had thought Germany would escape the worst of the world
recession thanks to its competitive position in emerging
markets. In the New Year, Merkel and Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrueck (SPD) rushed a relatively robust stimulus program
through the Bundestag that is timed to counter a surge in
unemployment just before the September elections. Like most
Germans, they doubt further deficit spending will generate
lasting growth, and fear too large a stimulus may cause
stagflation at home and dangerous new global imbalances.
Merkel and Steinbrueck remain bitter at the brush-off they
allegedly received during the last administration when they
advocated tighter financial oversight. Tougher regulations,
they insist, are essential to restore confidence in the
banking system and get credit flowing again, thus creating
the pre-conditions for a sustainable recovery.

¶4. (C/NF) Hoping to escape responsibility for the economic
crisis, Merkel has issued public critiques of U.S. recovery
policy that exaggerate the differences between Washington and
continental Europe. In fact, Germany faces many of the same
difficult choices as the U.S. The Chancellor is expected to
put forward a further stimulus package later this year. Her
government has bailed out big banks while holding firm on
state aid to ailing firms like Opel. The conventional wisdom
in Germany is that Opel could be rescued with minimum state
aid if only it could be separated from GM, but in fact there
is no viable business plan for the firm to stand on its own.
The Chancellor is surrounded by bad options: an
interventionist approach would further alienate economic
conservatives in her CDU (who are already defecting in droves
to the free-market FDP); if she does nothing, Steinmeier and
the SPD will harvest the goodwill of centrist voters for
trying to save Opel. Merkel has not been above shifting
responsibility to the USG and General Motors, which she and

BERLIN 00000345 002.2 OF 002

the German media unfairly blame for bleeding Opel dry. In
the end, Merkel,s government will likely be forced to prop
up at least parts of the automaker.

——————————————–
Increasing Political Caution during Campaign
——————————————–

¶5. (S/NF) Merkel and Steinmeier are pragmatists; on foreign
policy, in particular, there is more that unites them than
divides them. But the centrifugal forces of the election
campaign and the growing mistrust between the CDU and SPD
make it increasingly difficult for them to agree on any big
ideas about Germany,s role in the world or its relations
with the United States. Buffeted by events, Merkel is
struggling to define a convincing vision for &her8 Germany;
&competence8 is the sole component at this point. She is
blessed that Steinmeier, her principal competitor, faces even
greater difficulties. His party has lost its bearings in the
Grand Coalition and is plagued by internal divisions.
Steinmeier himself is a technocrat and a latecomer to
electoral politics — his shortcomings on stage are
significant. Steinmeier has tried to make up ground on
Merkel by publicly identifying himself with the new U.S.
Administration. However, his ability to deliver on policy
initiatives without the Chancellor,s political support is
limited.

¶6. (C/NF) Afghanistan is an example. Merkel has been
cautious throughout her chancellorship and has doggedly
resisted real or perceived pressure for Germany to take on a
larger military role. She and Steinmeier both have supported
the Comprehensive Approach, but the Chancellor,s CDU, in the
face of public skepticism, is reluctant even to consider
increasing police or civilian support. Steinmeier and the
SPD have been more forward-leaning, but they cannot deliver
on their own. You should emphasize that at the moment the
U.S. is not seeking significant additional military forces
from Germany, but that every member of the international
community will need to do much more (e.g., training security
forces and providing civilian assistance) if we are to be
successful.

—————————————
Policy Opportunities on Russia and Iran
—————————————

¶7. (C/NF) Germany should play a central role with the U.S.
in defining a coordinated western Russia policy that resets
the relationship without retreating from our values. The
winter gas crisis made Germans rethink Russia,s reliability
as a supplier, but the lack of alternatives and the
desirability of gas as a clean energy source have left the
government resigned to dependency on Russia in the
near-to-medium term. On energy as well as Georgia, neither
Merkel nor Steinmeier has identified areas where German
policy steps could help create a more persuasive set of
incentives for Russia to integrate further into rules-based
relationships and institutions. Meanwhile, Germany is
concerned about threats to economic and social stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, but prefers EU and IMF approaches
to limit its share of the bill.

¶8. (C/NF) Both Merkel and Steinmeier welcomed your Nowruz
address to the Iranian people and government. They support
the U.S. investment in the diplomatic track and agree that
Germany and the EU need to invest in the economic pressure
track. Germany,s close ties to Israel include an imperative
to defend Israel,s right to exist and to play an active role
in international non-proliferation efforts toward Iran.
Merkel will be looking to the meeting to gain a better
understanding of how you see the USG Iran policy unfolding
and what role we need Germany to play.

¶9. (U) Mr. President, Mission Germany is honored to support
you on your first overseas trip as President, and we look
forward to welcoming you in Baden-Baden.
Koenig

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETTC EFIN IR GM
SUBJECT: NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S TEAM EXAMINES NEXT
STEPS IN IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 b/d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellor Merkel set the German agenda on
Iran with her early November statement before the U.S.
Congress on “zero tolerance” for a nuclear armed Iran and the
need for tougher sanctions should engagement not work.
During a private roundtable hosted by Ambassador Murphy,
however, members of Germany’s Iran “brain-trust” from the
German Parliament, MFA, Ministry of Economics and top
government funded think tank welcomed the President’s
engagement policy, recommended broadening the dialogue to
areas of cooperation (drugs, Afghanistan, diplomatic
relations), betrayed little beyond a superficial knowledge of
the nuclear program, argued that Germany took the largest
economic hit from recent sanctions, and expressed doubts as
to the efficacy of sanctions, giving us a window into the
difficult task Chancellor Merkel will have in keeping her
government on her page. In the end, we assess that Merkel
will have her way. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The November 24 event at the Embassy included members
of Parliament from the four main German political parties:
FDP Elke Hoff, CDU Andreas Schockenhoff, Greens Kerstin
Mueller, and SPD Rolf Muetzenich. From the MFA, Policy
Planner Markus Ederer, DG for Economics Ruediger von Fritsch,
DG for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Amb. Peter Gottwald,
and Iran Task Force Director Andreas Krueger attended.
Ministry of Economics DG for External Economic Policy
Karl-Ernst Brauner and the Director of the German government
funded research institute Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP, or Institute for Science and Politics) Volker
Perthes also attended.

—————————————–
MFA: TRR Not Dead Yet; But Not Well Either
—————————————–

¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by thanking the
German government for its excellent cooperation on Iran and
asked his guests to share their thoughts on the Iranian
internal situation, especially given recent reports of the
expanded role of the IRGC in the cultural/educational spheres
of life, and how that might affect Iran’s external policy.
MFA DG for Disarmament Gottwald stated that if we were
correct in assessing the Iranian regime’s primary goal to be
survival, then we still had a chance with a negotiated
solution. He said that while the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) deal was not “well,” Germany wasn’t ready to pronounce
it “dead” quite yet. He concluded with a strong statement
saying that a nuclear armed Iran would be a nightmare in and
of itself and a disastrous blow to the NPT regime which was
why Germany would be a strong partner in support of further
sanctions.

¶4. (C) MFA Policy Planer Ederer said he thought Iran was
confused about what it wants and that the West might be even
more confused about how to get what we want. He said we want
Iranian behavior change, but we don’t agree yet what will get
us there. He said UN sponsored sanctions would isolate Iran
and limit its capacity, but questioned whether they would
change Tehran’s behavior. He said he realized sanctions
remained a good alternative to military action, but
questioned whether they were really capable of anything other
than just buying time.

——————————————
More Carrots before we Reach for the Sticks
——————————————

¶5. (C) SWP’s Perthes argued Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei’s primary interest was to maintain the security of
the system and prevent regime change. Perthes said Khamenei
feared a velvet revolution over all else, though regional
instability was a close second. He noted Iran remained
besieged by problems of drug smuggling, piracy, and
instability in Pakistan. He recommended more emphasis be
placed on trying to find an incentive for the regime to
cooperate on the regional track, which had already shown some
progress. He said the April 2009, 300 million dollar Iranian
pledge at the Pakistan donor’s conference was an important
symbol of the value the regime placed on regional security.
He suggested the West “broaden” relations with Iran to areas
where cooperation could be had: drugs, Afghanistan, and
diplomatic (especially Consular) ties. POL M/C noted this
was fine, but ignored the fact that time was not on our side.
Rather, Iran was installing new centrifuges each week. If
Iran wanted to build confidence or “broaden” relations, it
could modulate that pace, but time was not a luxury we had.
Gottwald agreed emphatically.

BERLIN 00001577 002 OF 003

¶6. (C) Changing course, Perthes said that if “sticks” had to
be used, he suggested more focus on “export-control” and less
on sanctions. He noted evidence suggested export control
regimes had already worked in slowing down centrifuge
progress. He concluded by saying that if sanctions must be
used, we should avoid all use of the word “crippling” and
instead focus on “targeted” sanctions in order not to turn
the Iranian masses against us and right back into
Ahmadinejad’s hands. He also suggested that “unofficial”
sanctions such as Russia’s decision not to sell the S300s
were more effective than most formal sanctions. If formal
sanctions had to be pursued he said only global sanctions
would be effective, and therefore advocated UNSC action.
Perthes said he saw readiness in the German business
community to accept financial loss if sanctions were truly
global, but they don’t want to see business opportunities
being lost to China or India.

——————————————— —-
Green Party : Too Late to Prevent, Need To Contain
——————————————— —-

¶7. (C) From the opposition, Green Party Foreign Policy
Spokesperson Kerstin Mueller said she was glad that the new
U.S. administration no longer talked about a threat of a
military option. But she also said she was skeptical that
Iran can be prevented from obtaining a nuclear capability
without a military option, and that it might even be too late
for a military option to be effective. She said she didn’t
see compromise within the interests of the regime and thought
the West should focus more attention on how to “control” a
nuclear-armed Iran.

——————————————-
FDP: Rank and File Grudging Partner on Iran?
——————————————–

¶8. (C) FDP Spokeswoman on Defense Policy, Elke Hoff opened
her remarks with a grudging acknowledgment of the coalition
agreement in which her party agreed that if engagement with
Iran on the nuclear dossier failed, sanctions would be
implemented. She added that she remained personally
skeptical as to their efficacy. She said additional
sanctions would serve the unintended consequence of rallying
the masses around Ahmadinejad.

¶9. (C) Hoff said she often hears from constituents in the
business community that German companies are getting
pressured from their American counterparts not to do business
in Iran, and yet they see plenty of U.S. products for sale in
Iran. Econ M/C intervened and stressed that the U.S. was
ready to prosecute any U.S. businesses in violation of U.S.
sanctions and had already done so. Hoff also suggested
offering German businesses financial compensation should new
sanctions come into play. In response to a criticism from
Hoff on whether the U.S. deadline created for engagement on
Iran reflected Obama’s domestic political agenda, the
Ambassador emphasized the deep commitment of the
administration to engagement.

—————————-
Germany is the Largest Loser
—————————-

¶10. (C) MFA DG for Economics Von Fritsch agreed with
Perthes’ suggestion to focus more on the carrots and not the
sticks. He noted that no single country has (recently)
sacrificed as much financially as Germany has, not just in
existing trade, but also in long term future contracts. Econ
M/C noted that U.S. business had also suffered enormous trade
and investment losses after 1979. Von Fritsch said if
sanctions were inevitable, German business preferred global
and clear sanctions as opposed to vague wording that can be
left open to differing interpretations. On correspondent
banking relations, Von Fritsch said the German government was
still examining the issue but that a complete severance of
correspondent banking relations including with Iran’s central
bank would not be possible since it would amount to a total
trade embargo.

¶11. (C) Ministry of Economics DG for External Policy Brauner
referenced the inclusion in German law of the presumptive
right to trade, and said that he was concerned that what the
German Customs and BAFA (export control agency under the
Ministry of Economics) were doing to encourage “Nullbescheid”
(pre-certification that specific trade with Iran is not
illicit) might actually be illegal, as German business had
complained. He said one important consideration for Germany

BERLIN 00001577 003 OF 003

was that a further crackdown on trade with Iran could
endanger repayment of the 4.5 billion Euros in outstanding
credits that Iran owed Germany. Germany had agreed not to
issue any new credit under its Hermes (OPIC-like) program,
but expected to be able to collect on outstanding credits.
Nonetheless, both Brauner and Von Fritsch emphasized that in
the event of no progress in negotiations with Iran, Germany
was ready to enter a new round of stronger sanctions, and
that we should look to Chancellor Merkel’s statements in the
U.S. Congress and FM Westerwelle’s reiterations of her strong
policy as the final say on which direction Germany would go
on Iran.

¶12. (C) CONCLUSION. The majority of the guests at the table
distinctly deferred to Perthes for guidance on where the Iran
issue might be headed or should be headed. This was striking
amongst such a high ranking group of people operationally
involved with the Iran issue. Also illuminating was the
variety of talking points employed by the participants to
define hurdles for sanction until debunked one at a time by
Embassy officers. The candor with which even some MFA and
Ministry of Economics officials expressed their skepticism on
the efficacy of pursuing tougher sanctions on Iran may mean
that Merkel will have to press hard within her own government
to deliver on her promise of implementing tougher sanctions
should engagement with Iran fail. None of our interlocutors,
however, questioned whether Merkel would, at the end of the
day, be able to “deliver” on her promises. If and when we
decide to go forward on the pressure track on Iran, the USG
may wish to reinforce Merkel’s position by showing
appreciation for Germany’s strong continuing support. END
CONCLUSION.
MURPHY

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OFAC SZUBIN, MONBORNE, MAHER
JUSTICE FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
USEU FOR CHASE, DODMAN, SNYDER
STATE FOR S/ES-O, EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, L AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT
PASSES ON GERMAN ABSTENTION

REF: A. BERLIN 1393
¶B. BERLIN 1377
¶C. BERLIN 1167

Classified By: DCM Greg T. Delawie for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: German Federal Interior Minister Thomas de
Maiziere overruled Justice Minister Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and abstained from voting at the
November 30 COREPER vote in Brussels on an interim U.S.-EU
agreement to continue the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.
De Maiziere’s decision allowed the agreement to pass and
followed weeks of engagement in Berlin, Brussels and
Washington as well as high-level interventions from Secretary
Clinton, Treasury Secretary Geithner, Attorney General
Holder, National Security Advisor Gen. Jones and Ambassador
Murphy. De Maiziere’s decision was difficult for him to make
given that the coalition agreement called for specific
revisions to the SWIFT agreement, none of which Germany
achieved, except a shortening of the interim period from 12
to 9 months. The episode has tested Germany’s new coalition
government just weeks after its formation with
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger heavily criticizing the
abstention. This experience suggests that we will need to
pay close attention to Germany during our negotiations on a
long-term TFTP agreement. END SUMMARY

Germany Relents Following Intense Pressure
—————

¶2. (C) Ambassador Murphy met with Interior Minister de
Maiziere on November 27 and urged him to support U.S.-EU
negotiations on an interim TFTP agreement, to which de
Maiziere indicated that he would abstain from voting on the
agenda item at the November 30 COREPER meeting. De
Maiziere’s decision, which followed a German request to
shorten the duration of the interim agreement to nine months
rather than twelve, facilitated the passing of the agreement
as Germany was the strongest holdout. De Maiziere’s decision
followed two weeks of intense lobbying in Berlin, Brussels
and Washington by Embassy Berlin, USEU, the Departments of
Treasury, State and Justice and the NSC. The campaign
included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney
General and the National Security Advisor to their German
counterparts. State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator
Benjamin urged support for the agreement during a two-day
visit to Berlin (see septel). Ambassador Murphy twice wrote
to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance,
Chancellery, and MFA) and made repeated calls to senior
decision makers, stressing the importance of the interim
agreement and the need for Germany to not block it. The DCM,
Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections heavily
engaged on the issue as well.

¶3. (C) De Maiziere (CDU) stressed that his decision was not
an easy one given that the Christian Democrat/Social Union
(CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition had
differing views on the TFTP program. The outcome
particularly irritated Justice Minister
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger because she had expressed
concerns about the TFTP dating back to the initial July
decision to give the negotiating mandate to the Swedish EU
Presidency. Furthermore, in October
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger had inserted language into the
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement specifically addressing the
TFTP negotiations and directing Germany to call upon the EU
to work towards a higher level of data protection (see Ref
B). Following de Maiziere’s decision, the Justice Minister
complained that her views were ignored and that the decision
has “upset millions of citizens of Europe.” De Maiziere told
the Ambassador that he would be expressing some criticisms of
the agreement publicly in order to reflect MoI concerns and
to deflect public criticism. He was subsequently quoted as
saying that “a not completely satisfactory agreement is
better than none at all.”

BERLIN 00001528 002 OF 002

German Vote Comes with Costs for the Coalition
———-

¶4. (C) De Maiziere intimated, and working level contacts have
confirmed, that Germany would like to avoid a repeat of our
all-out lobbying effort during the negotiations for a
long-term TFTP agreement. De Maiziere’s strong preference is
to seek consensus with his ministry colleagues. He
particularly wants to avoid another clash with the Justice
Minister on this issue as it has caused no small amount of
discord between the new coalition partners, who are having a
rocky start on a number of fronts. The incident is
particularly difficult for de Maiziere as he entered the
Interior Ministry stressing that he represented a break from
his predecessor Wolfgang Schaeuble, whom he felt overly
focused on security issues (see Ref A). De Maiziere surely
finds this whole experience regrettable as it put him in
exactly the position he did not want to be in: seemingly
siding with the U.S. over German interests, causing
disruption within the coalition, and compromising the data
privacy rights of German citizens.

Engaging the FDP on Data Privacy
———

¶5. (C) It is not altogether surprising that this disagreement
arose given the FDP’s reputation as a staunch defender of
citizens’ privacy rights (see Ref C). Nevertheless, the
intensity of this dispute should be a wake up call – we must
avoid repeating this as we look to completing the long-term
U.S.-EU TFTP agreement. The coalition agreement calls for
strict limitations on the use of TFTP data, no automatic
access to the system, data deletion requirements, clear rules
on sharing information with third parties and legal redress.
These positions will guide Germany’s views in the follow-on
negotiations, and we need to consider how to take them into
account in a way that does not complicate TFTP
implementation.

¶6. (C) Embassy Berlin is examining how we can reach out to
FDP ministers and parliamentarians to educate them on U.S.
data protection structures as this experience has
demonstrated that they are often misinformed on the nature of
our policies. We will likewise reach out to CDU/CSU decision
makers, in part to enlist their help in reaching the German
public. We also intend to make the point that countering
terrorism in a globalized world, where terrorists and their
supporters use open borders and information technology to
quickly move people and financing, requires robust
international data sharing.
MURPHY